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Artykuł

Data publikacji: 2023-02-23

The Great Return of the German Matter

War in Ukraine ought to bring about a breakthrough in German politics, comparable to the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Woe to Germany, woe to Europe and woe to NATO should that not come to pass, should the process of deputinising elites fail, should new quality not arise

German Chancellor Gerhard Shröder greets Russian President Vladimir Putin,Hanover, 10 April 2005

German Chancellor Gerhard Shröder greets Russian President Vladimir Putin,Hanover, 10 April 2005

Today, it is a truism to suggest that Germany has been committing political errors over the past few decades. Yet save a tiny expert community, few realise how deeply these errors are rooted in German history or the German way of perceiving reality. The process of building energy interests-based relations with the Soviets (in later years: Russia) can be traced back to the 1960 s, the intents and mindset under consistent criticism from Washington.

The End of Ostpolitik Draws Near?

The Druzhba (Friendship) oil pipeline was stage one, commissioned in 1964 and criticised from the word go by the Kennedy administration who duly forced Berlin into a ban on importing large-scale pipes potentially useful to building new installations. Yet Willy Brandt’s notorious Ostpolitik had the capacity to sidestep such obstacles; oil imports expanded to include gas imports in the nineteen seventies. The bitter truth Poland chooses to disremember is that Brandt’s Eastern Policy was not designed around ardent gestures or reconciliation with the Polish nation. Its main purpose was to develop relations with Moscow, allowing contemplation of peaceful unification while affording Berlin greater autonomy in relations with the United States. This is all blatantly visible in multiple interviews with and declarations by Egon Bahr - stern political realist and head of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brandt’s cabinet.

Ronald Reagan attempted to convince Germany to restrict gas imports from the USSR time and again in the 1980 s, the United States then engaged in an ersatz war with Moscow in Afghanistan. Yet to no avail: by 1989, Eastern gas would cover a massive third of German demand. And that is but a piece in the bilateral Berlin-Moscow relations puzzle, culminating, as it were, in a green light for reunification during the legendary Two Plus Four Conference (1990).

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